not even apply to foreign products but grants a benefit to national products, a cross-border effect is present and EU law applies.
When they apply, the rules on the free movement of goods have direct effect. This means that they can be directly relied on before national courts or other public bodies to challenge any national rule or practise that restricts free movement.9 Consequently, individuals and businesses do not have to wait for public enforcement against restrictions, but can directly attack them themselves on the basis of EU law.10 So far, the Treaty provisions on goods, do not yet seem to have horizontal direct effect, even though they can be relied upon against private bodies that wield certain public authority.11
Financial Restrictions
The first category of prohibited restrictions concern financial restrictions, which can either be customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect (Article 30 TFEU), or internal taxation measures restricting free movement (Article 110 TFEU).
Customs Duties and Charges Having an Equivalent Effect
Customs duties include any form of payment that has to be made because a good crosses a border, also of a fiscal nature. All customs duties are prohibited under Article 30 TFEU, without exception. In practice, customs duties no longer occur in the EU, which attests to the effectiveness of this prohibition. Article 30 TFEU, however, also prohibits 'charges having an equivalent effect to customs duties' . This means that Member States are not allowed to adopt other measures that are technically speaking not a customs duty, but in practice have the same effect. Consider, for example, Portugal imposing an obligatory veterinary check at the border and charging a mandatory fee of 10 euros per animal. Such a measure would not be a customs duty, but would have the same effect of increasing the price of imported live stock. 9 The CJEU has even held that a statement by a public official can be a prohibited restriction To make sure Member States do not develop creative alternative measures to circumvent the prohibition of Article 30 TFEU, the CJEU has given a very broad and effect-based interpretation to the concept of 'charges having an equivalent effect' , which covers: any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense.12
All charges having an equivalent effect are in principle prohibited, as the Treaty provides no possible justifications for them.13 The CJEU, however, has allowed two very narrow exceptions. Firstly, a charge may be allowed where it covers the actual costs of an inspection required by EU law itself. Where the EU, for example as during the BSE crisis, imposes mandatory health inspections on beef at the border, Member States may recover the costs of these inspections from importers. The charges imposed, however, may never exceed the actual costs of the inspections.14 Secondly, charges are allowed where they only form compensation for services rendered to the importer on a voluntary basis. For example, an importer may voluntarily request to use a warehouse with cooling facilities owned by the state whilst awaiting further shipping of the goods. If so, the state may charge a reasonable fee for this service.15 As soon as there is any form of obligation, directly or indirectly, to make use of a specific service, however, or if there is no real benefit to the individual importer, no charges may be imposed.16
Internal Taxation as a Restriction on Free Movement of Goods
Member States are also not allowed to effectively recreate customs duties via their internal taxes. Just imagine France imposing an additional VAT of 20% on German cars, which would undo the prohibition of Article 30 TFEU completely. Therefore, even though Member States retain the competence to organize their own tax system, they may not use their taxes to restrict free movement of goods.17 For 'whenever a fiscal levy is likely to discourage imports of goods originating in other Member States to the benefit of domestic production' , it is caught by the prohibition of Article 110 TFEU.18 To protect free movement, Article 110 TFEU prohibits both discriminatory taxation and more subtle measures that do not discriminate but still have the effect of protecting national products. Discriminatory taxes are prohibited in Article 110(1) TFEU, which determines that 'No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. ' For Article 110(1) TFEU to apply, one must first assess if a tax is imposed on 'similar' products. Here the CJEU primarily looks at the comparability of products from the perspective of the consumer. As the CJEU held in Commission v France, similarity must be assessed on the basis 'not of the criterion of the strictly identical nature of the products but on that of their similar and comparable use.'19 This may lead the CJEU into rather factual assessments involving substances as fruit wine, whiskey or that evergreen of EU law, bananas.20
If products are sufficiently similar, one must next assess if the tax at issue discriminates between them, either directly or indirectly. Direct discrimination means that imported products are taxed differently precisely because they originate from another Member State. Indirect discrimination, which is more common, means that taxation differs based on a criterion that seems neutral as to nationality, but in reality affects imported goods more than national goods. The case of Humblot provides a good example of indirect discrimination, and how Member States may use it to protect their own industries.21 In Humblot, the French tax on cars with more than a 16 cylinder engine volume rose sharply from 1.100 French francs to 5000 francs. It just so happened that no car produced in France had a cylinder engine volume over 16, but many German cars did. The French tax measure, therefore, did not directly discriminate based on nationality, but the criterion of engine volume indirectly discriminated against Article 110(2) TFEU may come in play where the products concerned are not similar, but the taxes nevertheless provide indirect protection to domestic products against competing importing products.23 For a tax to be caught by Article 110(2) two conditions must be met. First, the relevant products must be in a competitive relationship. This logically is a lower threshold than the similarity that is required for Article 110(1) TFEU to apply.24 A competitive relationship essentially concerns substitutability, i.e. the question if consumers might choose product A instead of product B, for example if A becomes 5% cheaper. The classic example of products that are not comparable but do compete is beer and (cheap) wine. In Commission v. UK, the tax imposed on wine was more than four times higher than the tax on beer, especially in the case of the lower segments of wine.25 As in Humblot, it just so happens that the UK produces almost no wine, but does produce a lot of beer. Ultimately, the CJEU held that wine and beer were not similar enough to fall under Article 110(1) TFEU, but they were substitutable enough for consumers to be in competition with each other in the meaning of Article 110(2) TFEU, as consumers can switch from beer to wine.
Second, if products compete with each other, the tax may not protect the domestic product. Here the CJEU primarily looks at the effect of the tax on consumers. In Commission v. UK, for example, the CJEU found that the much higher taxes on wine did protect the domestic beer, and hence was prohibited under Article 110(2) TFEU, because the tax difference was so high that it affected consumer choices and the tax difference could not be objectively justified on any ground. Member States, therefore, do of course retain the freedom to differentiate their taxes on different products based on objective criteria. For Article 110(2) TFEU to apply, therefore, a real protective effect must be shown, the mere existence of a difference in tax rate is not enough.26
Article 30 and 110 TFEU jointly aim to prevent financial obstacles to free movement, The two provisions are mutually exclusive. A case, therefore, can never fall under both provisions. A financial charge is either based on the product crossing the border, and hence a customs duty under Article 30 TFEU, or not, in which case it falls under Article 110 TFEU. For example, if an identical charge is levied from both imported and domestic products, this forms an internal tax, even if the tax for imported products just happens to be collected at the border.27 For in such situations, the charge itself does not depend on the crossing of the border, only the time and place of collection does.
10.4
Non-Financial or Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
As the EAC experience has also shown, real free movement of goods cannot be achieved by just removing financial or tariff barriers. provisions into very broad prohibitions that are capable of capturing almost any national rule. Subsequently, they describe the exceptions EU law provides to Member States to defend NTBs that serve a public interest, and the way the CJEU balances restrictions to free movement and such public interests.
The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions and Measures Having Equivalent Effect
Article 34 TFEU forms the key prohibition behind the free movement of goods in the EU. It provides that:
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.30
The concept of a 'quantitative restriction' thereby refers to measures that directly concern the quantity or the number of products that may be imported or exported.31 This, of course, includes a total ban, that allows zero products to be imported or exported,32 but also partial restrictions that allow only a certain number of products to be imported.33 Like customs duties, however, quantitative restrictions are relatively rare in the EU. The main prohibition in Article 34 TFEU, therefore, concerns 'measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions' or MEQRs.
As MEQR is a rather vague concept, it was once again up to the CJEU to provide a definition. One route the CJEU could take, in line with Article 18 TFEU, was to interpret this concept narrowly as a prohibition on national measures that discriminated against imported goods. In Dassonville, its seminal judgment on the free movement of goods, however, the CJEU took a very different approach and provided a very wide definition of MEQRs as: Under this definition, even measures that are capable of potentially hindering trade in an indirect fashion qualify as measures of equivalent effect, and hence are in principle prohibited under Article 34 TFEU. Crucially, the CJEU also did not require any form of (indirect) discrimination to be present, but only looked at the actual or possible effect of a measure on trade.
The broad Dassonville definition of MEQR was further developed in Cassis de Dijon, another seminal judgment on the free movement of goods. In this case, the applicant wanted to import the liqueur 'Cassis de Dijon' into Germany from France. Under an interesting German approach to consumer protection, however, the liqueur did not contain enough alcohol. German law required that liqueurs such as Cassis de Dijon had an alcohol content of at least 25%, whereas the French liqueur only contained 15-20% alcohol. The German authority, therefore, refused to allow the importation. The applicant claimed this constituted a prohibited MEQR. Germany contended, however, that the measure did not discriminate in any way as it applied equally to German and French drinks, and therefore also did not violate Article 34 TFEU. The CJEU was not convinced:
In practice, the principal effect of requirements of this nature is to promote alcoholic beverages having a high alcohol content by excluding from the national market products of other Member States which do not answer that description It therefore appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the rule of Member State of a minimum alcohol content for the purposes of the sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an obstacle to trade which is incompatible with the provisions of Article [34] of the treaty.35
Even measures that in no way distinguish between national and foreign products, therefore, qualify as MEQRs if they in any way hinder foreign goods that want to enter the national market.
Cassis de Dijon also introduced another far reaching doctrine that continued to play an important role in EU free movement law: the principle of mutual recognition.36 In principle, Member States should trust each other's regulations to be sufficient and adequate, and therefore recognize and allow products that have been legally produced according to the standards of another Member State. In the case of Cassis de Dijon, the fact that the liqueur complied with French legislation should in principle suffice for the German authorities, unless they could prove why in this particular case French products should not be trusted.
It is difficult to exaggerate just how broad the definition of an MEQR under Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon is. The definition only requires that a national rule in some way makes it more difficult for a product to enter the market, not that the rule is harder on foreign products or imposes a dual burden.37 In practice, however, almost any rule that is worth having will require something, and therefore make it more difficult to enter the market than if the rule did not exist. For example, any product standard such as requiring real cocoa in chocolate or prohibiting certain additives in baby milk will make it more difficult for foreign producers to enter the market than if these standards did not apply. All such national standards, therefore, qualify as MEQRs under Article 34 TFEU. In addition, the CJEU has also held that Member States have a positive obligation to prevent or stop any behaviour by private individuals that might interfere with the free movement of goods. In Spanish Strawberries, for example, the French government was found to have violated Article 34 TFEU by not stopping French farmers from attacking and destroying trucks with Spanish fruit that was outcompeting French fruit.38 Such a general positive obligation to actively remove any restrictions to free movement caused by private individuals could also be a far reaching instrument in the EAC context. Now as we will see, EU law does not just set aside such eminently desirable rules as health standards for baby milk, as these may often be justified.39 The only point here is that the very broad definition developed by the Court does qualify all such rules as MEQRs (or NTBs) and therefore brings them under the scope of the prohibition in Article 34 TFEU, and under the scrutiny of EU and national courts.
The benefit of this very broad definition was that it covered all potential NTBs, and removed any space that Member States might have to develop creative NTBs that do protect national products fall outside a narrower definition. The main downside of this definition, however, was that almost all national 37 The MEQR, moreover, may even consist if some practises or factual behaviour of public officials. In one extreme case, even a negative statement by a government official on rules now qualified as MEQRs and could therefore be challenged on the basis of EU law. After Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, therefore, national courts and the CJEU were increasingly flooded with cases. Many of these challenged national rules that did technically qualify as MEQRs, but in reality were not concerned with restricting the free movements of goods. Symbolic in this regard became the Sunday Trading cases in which traders challenged national rules requiring shops to close on Sunday. As this meant traders could not sell their products on a Sunday, this indeed restricted their access to the market, but it was not the kind of restriction Article 34 TFEU was intended to capture. 40 Consequently, the search was on for a way to limit the definition of an MEQR in a way that would prevent abuse of Article 34 TFEU but would not undermine the effectiveness of Article 34 TFEU in targeting real MEQRs. In the end, the CJEU opted for a less than convincing approach. In Keck, another landmark judgment, it introduced a problematic distinction between product norms and selling arrangements, holding that under certain conditions selling arrangements do not fall under the scope of Article 34 TFEU.41
Keck concerned two traders, Keck and Mithouard, which were being prosecuted in France for reselling goods at a loss, something that was prohibited under French law. The law, however, only prohibited resellers from doing so, as manufacturers were allowed to sell at a loss. Keck and Mithouard claimed this French rule violated, amongst other things, Article 34 TFEU. Considering its importance, and because it gives a good insight into the reasoning of the Court at this stage of the internal market development, the relevant paragraphs of the judgement are reproduced below: National legislation imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss is not designed to regulate trade in goods between Member States.
Such legislation may, admittedly, restrict the volume of sales, and hence the volume of sales of products from other Member States, in so far as it deprives traders of a method of sales promotion. But the question remains whether such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legislation in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports.
In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article [34] of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to reexamine and clarify its case-law on this matter.
It is established by the case-law beginning with "Cassis de Dijon" that, in the absence of harmonization of legislation, obstacles to free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article [34] . This is so even if those rules apply without distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods.
By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article [34] of the Treaty. Accordingly, the reply to be given to the national court is that Article 30 of the EEC Treaty is to be interpreted as not applying to legislation of a Member State imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss.42
The CJEU therefore proceeded to create a new category of regulations concerning 'selling arrangements' . Provided such selling arrangements 1) apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory, and 2) affect the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States in the same manner, both in law and in fact, they do not constitute MEQRs under Article 34 TFEU and hence are not prohibited.43 The concept of selling arrangements, however, was not really defined, but it includes those rules dealing with how a product is sold, rather than rules on how the product itself is made.44
Keck indeed reduced the scope of Article 34 TFEU, even if it did so in a rather construed and complicated way that has kept lawyers engaged for the past 25 years. One of the opportunities for EAC law, therefore might be to find a better way to delineate the scope of the EAC free movement clauses, even though the more urgent challenge might be to make the prohibitions themselves more coherent and effective first. 45 One of the questions Keck left open concerned the qualification of rules that do not regulate the product itself or the way it is sold, but rather the way a product may be used in a Member State. A rule that caps the maximum speed on the highway to a 100 kilometres per hour, for example, does not regulate how a car must be made or how it must be sold. It may affect, however, the 42 Keck, paras. 11-18. 43 One important application of this requirement concerns the internet. The CJEU has held that restricting sales via the internet will always affect the marketing of foreign prodcuts more negatively since the on-line sales are usually the only channel available to sell foreign products, whereas domestic products usually also have other outlets such as physicial market access of cars. An expensive hyper-car, for example, may become less attractive if you can never really put it to use. In more recent case law, the CJEU has now confirmed that such rules on use do form MEQRs, and therefore fall under the scope of Article 34 TFEU. One such case concerned the Italian prohibition to use a trailer behind a motorcycle.46 This rule affected the sale of trailers for motorcycles, as it prohibited their use, even though it did not regulate the product as such. The CJEU held that in addition to product rules, Article 34 TFEU also covers 'any other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State.'47 This more recent case law, therefore, again widens the scope of Article 34 TFEU, and restricts the Keck exception to selling arrangements in the stricter sense.
Justifying MEQRs
Precisely because Article 34 TFEU captures so many national rules, the question of justification becomes essential. For without a proper doctrine of justification, the EU would run the risk of setting aside a great deal of very welcome national rules that for example protect public health, public security or the environment. The last part of this Chapter, therefore, briefly discusses the question of justification: how can a Member State justify a restriction on the free movement of goods? As the question of justification is often highly context dependent, and as a tremendous wealth of case law exists, this part focuses on the structure and main characteristics of the test used to see if national measures are justified, as understanding this test allows one to independently analyse specific cases on justification.
Restrictions on free movement may be justified if they 1) serve a legitimate aim, 2) in a proportionate manner.48 There are two types of legitimate aims, In the same Cassis de Dijon judgment that confirmed Dassonville and introduced mutual recognition, The CJEU recognized this problem and recognized a second, non-Treaty based category of justificatory grounds that Member States could rely on. This category of mandatory requirements has become known as the rule of reason exceptions:
In the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing of alcohol (. . .) it is for the Member States to regulate all matters relating to the production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their own territory.
Obstacles to movement within the community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.51
The Court gives the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer as examples of mandatory requirements that may justify restrictions on free movement. Crucially, however, the category of mandatory requirements is an open one. The CJEU is open to accept any reasonable public interest that a Member State may want to serve as a possible ground for justification. Later case law, for example, accepted grounds such as the protection of the environment and of biological resources,52 consumer protection53 or freedom of expression54 as acceptable mandatory grounds.
The rule of reason, therefore, greatly expands the grounds a Member State may rely on to justify restrictions, thereby allowing for a better balancing of free movement and public interests. Some limits, however, do apply. Firstly, the CJEU does accept any purely economic grounds.55 Secondly, under the orthodox approach, rule of reason grounds may only be used to justify restrictions that are indirectly discriminatory or non-discriminatory. Restrictions that are directly discriminatory may only be justified under a ground listed in Article 36 TFEU, although the CJEU does not always seem to follow this rule religiously. 56 The main challenge for Member States in justifying an MEQR, however, usually is not to find an acceptable ground under Article 36 TFEU or the rule of reason, but to satisfy the proportionality test that comes next.
Proportionality of MEQRs
An MEQR is only justified if it is proportionate in relation to its aim. For internal market cases, the proportionality test asks two questions, relating to the suitability and the necessity of the MEQR. Crucially, both have to be assessed not in abstract but in relation to the specific aim or aims provided as the legitimate aim.
The question of suitability essentially asks if a measure can actually achieve the objective it is supposed to serve. For instance, if the aim is to protect children against too much sugar in soft-drinks, a measure imposing a maximum sugar content is suitable to achieve this aim, a measure just prohibiting French soft-drinks is not. The CJEU has further developed the suitability test by introducing the criterion of consistency, even if the CJEU does not always apply this criterion or does not apply it as stringently as it could. The central idea is that a measure can only be suitable if it achieves its objective in a consistent and systematic manner.57 This inter alia means that a measure should not undermine the very aim it is trying to achieve. An early application of this logic can be seen in Conegate, where the UK had seized a consignment consisting 'essentially of inflatable dolls which were clearly of a sexual nature' as these violated public morality.58 At the same time, however, the UK did allow national production and sale of similar inflatable devices, which led the CJEU to find that: a Member State may not rely on grounds of public morality within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty in order to prohibit the importation of certain goods on the grounds that they are indecent or obscene, where the same goods may be manufactured freely on its territory and marketed on its territory subject only to an absolute prohibition on their transmission by post, a restriction on their public display and, in certain regions, a system of licensing of premises for the sale of those goods to customers aged 18 and over.59
If it wants to, a court could impose far reaching scrutiny via a consistency test, as many political measures will not be wholly consistent, either internally or compared to other measures.60 In practice, however, the real scrutiny takes place in the context of necessity.
The necessity test asks if the same objective could not have been achieved with a less far reaching measure. In other words, is the MEQR the least restrictive measure that can be adopted to achive the public aim being pursued?61 In our example on the requirement to have less sugar in soft-drinks, for example, the question could be asked if the same objective could not be reached by better labeling. Could a clear labeling requirement forcing producers to clearly indicate sugar content and calories perhaps achieve the same objective without needing to impose a maximum sugar content?
It is at this stage that the CJEU can be extremely strict, truly requiring the Member States to show that there was no real alternative.62 At the same time, the application of the necessity test also gives the CJEU a certain flexibility. For example, in more morally or politically sensitive cases, it may apply a lighter touch and give some more leeway to the Member States, where in other cases it may be very strict indeed.63 Predicting the precise application of the necessity test in a particular case therefore requires an analysis of the courts case law in the particular field involved, as well as looking at the general principles and rules for the free movement of goods. As we will see in Chapters 11, 12 and 13, the other freedoms have all followed the general development of goods, meaning the creation of a wide prohibition, followed by the creation of additional ground for justification and a large body of case law on whether specific national measures may be justified or not. 
